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Abstract 
 
We address the problem of the development 
of representations and their relationship to the 
environment. We study a software agent which 
develops in a network a representation of its 
simple environment which captures and 
integrates the relationships between agent and 
environment through a closure mechanism. The 
inclusion of a variable behavior modifier allows 
better representation development. This can be 
confirmed with an internal description of the 
closure mechanism, and with an external 
description of the properties of the 
representation network. 
Keywords : Closure, representation 
development, behavior modifiers, emotion, 
affective states, biological motivations, symbol-
matter problem. 
1. Introduction 
Ziemke (2001) distinguished five distinct categories 
of embodiment relevant to the epigenetic phenomenon: 
1) Structural coupling between the agent and its 
environment; 2) Historical embodiment as the result of 
a history of structural coupling. This includes the first 
category and is so general that a rock can be considered 
as having historical or structural embodiment; 3) 
Physical embodiment being systems connected with the 
world via a set of sensors and actuators, to hold the 
“Physical Grounding Hypothesis” (Brooks, 1990); 4) 
“Organismoid” embodiment or organism-like bodily 
form, stressing the specific restrictions related to 
specific cognitive problems. 5) “Organismic” 
embodiment of autopoietic living systems, based on the 
idea of Maturana and Varela (1987) and von Uexküll 
(1928) that cognition is what living systems do in 
interaction with their environment, reflecting that 
“there is a clear difference between living organisms, 
which are autonomous and autopoietic, and man-made 
machines, which are heteronomous and allopoietic”.  In 
this perspective, only with organismic embodiment 
could produce artificial autopoietic systems. 
However, organismic embodiment includes 
development in all the biological ways of organization, 
since living systems develop in time and in an 
integrated way along the POE space (with phylogenic, 
ontogenetic and epigenetic organizations as 
dimensions) (Sipper et al. 1997) when they interact 
with their environment. Within this perspective, 
classical specific-task artificial systems are points in the 
POE space, showing dynamics specific -to-contexts. On 
the other hand, biological systems trace trajectories in 
the POE space. Therefore, development research should 
be interested in processes which allow trajectories, 
although practical difficulties (Ibid), take us to consider 
simplifications, generally constraining ourselves to the 
epigenetic or phylogenic dimension. 
One way to follow is to consider the degree of 
intelligence of a system related to its  use and creation of 
representations (Steels, 1995). Representations can be 
explicit (or symbolic) but also implicit (or emergent 
(Steels, 2003)). 
A necessary property of an epigenetic robot is the 
ability to generate representations (Zlatev and 
Balkenius, 2001). However, it is not clear nor very well 
understood what internal representations are, or how 
they develop (external representations require an 
internal representation to acquire meaning). It seems it 
is a common assumption to think of internal 
representations as things, or material  objects, as 
sketched in Figure 1a. Under this assumption, if we 
dissect the brain of an animal, we would find 
representations somewhere there. Contrasting this 
assumption, we believe that internal representations are 
the intertwined relationships between significant 
perceptions and significant actuations of an embodied 
agent interacting in an environment, as portrayed in 
Figure 1b. Representations do have a physical structure, 
but this is only a part of them. This structure is 
manipulated by a mechanism (e.g. brain), in order to 
actuate accordingly to the actual state of the agent. In 
order to understand the representation, we need to study 
both the physical structure, and the (functional) 
dynamics of the agent coupled with its environment 
(Mitchell, 1998; Rocha, 2001). Only a dynamical 
process can give a value to the physical structure. 
Different mechanisms can produce internal 
representations, but these are not in the mechanisms. 
We can say that the mechanisms are external, because 
we can analyze and decompose them. Representations 
of this type are internal, because they depend on the 
relations of the agent mechanism, sensors, and 
actuators, with its environment. We cannot take a 
representation “out of the agent”, because it is “in” the 
relationship between agent and environment. They have 
a physical part, but we cannot understand it without the 
relationship. A physical state can represent more than 
one thing. What gives value to that state, what makes 
the state a representation, is the relationship.  
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Figure 1. Different views of internal representations 
 
We are interested in the development and internal 
dynamics of representations because the dynamics 
could be seen as the “motor” of a closure process 
within systems (Pattee, 1995; Collier, 2000; Rocha, 
2001; Emmeche, 2000). The view of Maturana and 
Varela (1987) of organismic embodiment already 
assumes a complete closure. However, we are interested 
in how this closure comes to place. The closure process 
can be seen as a mode of description complementary to 
physical laws (Pattee, 1995). We are not interested on 
how an action selection mechanism can emerge 
depending on the predictive power of representations. 
We are interested in the development of representations, 
not in their use. 
Representations need to be non-random, capturing 
some particular structure of the interaction with the 
environment. The more structure representations 
capture, the more “potential use” and “knowledge” they 
will have. In an epigenetic process, the formation of 
representations must catch first the simplest type of 
structure, i.e. historical embodiment. However, 
considering just this type of embodiment is not enough 
to provide any autonomy to the system. This is why we 
are interested in a simple system’s “internal dynamics” 
helping to bootstrap mo re structure into the 
representation. 
In this paper we examine how a behavior modifier 
(Dörner, 2003; Dörner and Hille 1995) affects the 
structural properties of an evolving representation as an 
internal dynamics responding to the agent’s knowledge 
state. Behavior modifiers can produce behaviors which 
can be considered as emotions by an observer. 
The representation will be considered as a network 
(directed graph) built under certain rules which 
compose a closure mechanism. This incorporates 
sensory signals and actuations, and relates and 
integrates them. The closure rules imprint by 
themselves some structural properties because they 
grow only by detecting and incorporating affective 
states (distinguishable states) as nodes (Sheutz, 2000; 
Sheutz and Sloman, 2001) and the relations between 
them (actuations) as arcs in a series of simple steps. 
The reported experiments analyze two aspects: 1) the 
structural properties of the resulting representation as 
indicators of the agent’s assimilated “knowledge” 
resulting from the interaction with the environment, 
being the useful macrovariables from an objective point 
of view; and 2) the closure mechanism’s dynamics, as 
the internal, and therefore subjective, way the system 
develops its representation. The hypothesis is that 
modifying appropriately the behavior in function of its 
subjective “state of knowledge”, the system will obtain 
benefits in the overall “macro” structure. 
2. Methodology 
To develop and analyze representations, we need 
conditions in which the agent copes with enough 
number of similar situations to “catch” (or “construct”) 
knowledge as Piaget thought (Montangero and 
Maurice-Naville, 1997). The easiest way to do this  is 
by interacting in an environment, simple enough to 
provide similar (but not identical) conditions. This is 
achieved playing “pragmatic games”: every time an 
event occurs, the scenario restarts with similar 
conditions. This term is used here in resemblance of 
‘Language Games’ (Steels, 1996), but as a 
methodology to study epigenetic development. 
A characteristic of pragmatic games is that they can 
be carried out by the agent only by chance, as a result of 
its capabilities and the environment’s characteristics. It 
means that the agent has the possibility to play the game 
and complete it with no more than the inborn 
capabilities. The agent can move allowing errors. As in 
language games, pragmatic games have no punishment 
or reward, success or failure. 
3. Experimental setup 
The implementation we developed to contrast our 
ideas is a pragmatic game called the “feed game”, a  
subset of the micro-world used by Drescher (1991) to 
study Piaget’s Schemes. This involves  a 2D 7x7-grid 
world in which there is an agent consisting of one 5X5-
grid “eye” with a central 1x1 square “fovea”, a 1x1 
“hand”, and a 1x1 “mouth”. Within the world “objects” 
of size 1x1 can exist. The agent has four independent 
actuators, to move its hand and eye in the two 
dimensions. The eye’s movements are restricted to 
focusing of the fovea within the world. The hand has 
the same constraint. 
In the feed game, an object is placed randomly in the 
environment. If the hand passes over the object, it will 
be attached to the hand. If the hand holding the object 
passes over the mouth, the object is “eaten”, and a new 
object appears at a random location, and the game starts 
again. 
In Figure 2 we can appreciate a snapshot of the 
experimental setup: the grid stands for the visual field 
of the eye, with the fovea in the centre. A green (light) 
square at the bottom of the environment stands for the 
mouth. The hand is represented by a blue (dark) square, 
and the object by a red circle. 
 Figure 2. Feed Game 
During the feed game, each of the four actuators 
chooses  randomly among three possible options: 
decrease, maintain, or increase (-1, 0, or 1) the actual 
positions of the eye and hand in both dimensions (ex, 
ey, hx, hy), constrained by the environment. An 
actuation would be a set of four values of the actuators. 
An actuator is specified by a set of four (-1, 0, or 1) 
values ex, ey, hx, and hy. These are, respectively: the 
displacement for the eye in the x and y directions and 
the displacement for the hand in the x and y directions. 
Each one of the 25 eye’s cell senses the colors R 
(red), G (green), or B (blue) of the objects in the visual 
field, sending 3 bits to the agent, one for each color. 
Then the eye’s sensing signal consists  of 75 bits. The 
‘hand’ and the ‘mouth’ contribute to the total sensing 
vector with one bit each one indicating if their position 
coincides with an object. Then a sensing state is 
conformed by a vector of 77 bits. The agent has no 
proprioception, in the sense that it has no register of the 
relative position of its hand, eye, nor mouth. 
Additional to the sensing states, the system has other 
input signal from a set of distinguishable innate 
biological motivations.  These are indicated by a 5-bit 
vector: Three bits for the fovea, each one for detecting 
R, G or B, one for the “hand” and other for the 
“mouth”. Therefore, there are potentially 32 different 
biological motivations, although in our simple 
simulations less than ten are bootstrapped. These 
biological motivations do not have any ‘appetitive’ or 
‘aversive’ character. They only are distinguishable and 
at the beginning they are not related with any sensorial 
state. 
4. Closure Mechanism 
Searching generality, we consider the use of directed 
graphs, a type of networks, as an adequate way to 
obtain and develop a representation for the agent. 
We consider a signal as a situation which can be 
distinguishable for the agent and has been incorporated 
in the representation. In a simplified way, we will say 
that a process is closed if an actuation  is related with 
the signals and the signals are related with the 
actuation . In this sense, the closure mechanism must be 
a process considering how to introduce significant 
signals and actuations in the representation and how to 
identify if they are or not related. In our directed graph, 
the nodes will have the signal information and the arcs 
the actuation information. 
The dynamics and structural properties resulting in 
the network will be strongly related to the particular 
choice of the closure mechanism because this affects 
how nodes and arcs are introduced to the network 
(Strogatz, 2001). The closure mechanism was thought 
in probabilistically favoring category’s formation 
(Hillman, 1997). 
The closure mechanism will incorporate relevant 
nodes and arcs, modifying their status. It reaches a class 
of “well formed” links between nodes, they will be 
called facts, having some relation with the (Drescher, 
1991)’s schemas but constructed with different criteria  
and motivations1. 
To develop the representation, we incorporate only 
nodes which are affective states (Sheutz, 2000; Sheutz 
and Sloman, 2001) for the agent. They represent any 
state of the agent that could affect it , for better or worse; 
including emotions, pains, desires, preferences, etc., but 
not measures. For our aim, we are only interested in 
their distinguishable character, being indispensable to 
filter information from the world and to establish 
organization. Biological motivations are considered as 
affective states, since they are distinguishable. 
With this conception, sensing states are not affective 
states, because sensing alone has  no relevance to the 
agent. The importance of a sensing state requires to be 
captured into a representation in order to acquire a 
value (relative to the agent). A sensing state can give 
place to an affective state if some value becomes 
associated to it. An affective state can be seen as a 
signal. These can become related through actuations. 
The possibility of establishing these relationships 
allows the agent to develop a structured representation 
in an autonomous way. The degree of integration of 
these relationships reflects the “knowledge” the agent 
has about its world. In our implementation, there is no 
use of this knowledge, but certainly it could be 
incorporated to perform e.g. some goal-directed task. 
Even when the actuations are random, the relationship 
between signals and actuations is structured. This 
structure is reflected in two ways: internally, during the 
closure mechanism, and externally, analyzing the 
network properties. Therefore, two modes of 
description are necessary (Pattee, 1995). 
In our experiments, the initial representation/network 
is empty. The agent has as inputs the sensing states and 
biological motivations. Every time the agent 
experiences a particular biological motivation, a record 
is created saving the sensing states associated with it. 
A sensing state can give place to an affective state or 
a potential affective state –and then incorporated to the 
representation—by two mechanisms :  
1. Detecting affective states from biological 
motivations. After a certain number of iterations (500 in 
our simulations), the system “falls” in a process in 
trying to determine if the biological motivations have 
some specific associated sensing state. Then the 
affective state represents the sensing  bits always present 
when the biological motivation has been experienced. 
2. Potential affective states. If the sensing state at 
time t corresponds to an affective state, then a node 
                                                                 
1 For Drescher, a casual (functional) relationship is searched, 
being reliability the last test. For us, only a significant 
departing from randomness in actuations establishes a deep 
relationship between affective states, stressing a non 
functional relationship between them. 
corresponding to the sensing state in the time t-1 is  
incorporated in the representation, as well the directed 
arc between the nodes  (representing the actuation). The 
new node is called potential affective state. 
A potential affective state becomes affective state if 
its frequency exceeds some value2 (8 in our 
simulations). 
The relationships between nodes (arcs) can be 
incorporated in the representation in two ways: 
1. When a potential affective state is created. 
2. When the agent experiences two sensing states 
having associated existing nodes (affective states or 
potential affective states) in the representation. 
Every time an arc is crossed, the frequency and the 
performed actuation  are recorded in the arc. 
Once the arc exists in the network, its status can be 
modified with the recorded actuations’ information 
during the process in the following way: 
1. If the frequency of occurrence in experiencing a 
specific arc is larger than a given value (8 in our 
simulations), it becomes a frequent arc and the 
movement’s distribution of probabilities for the 
actuators are computed from the history and saved in 
the arc in the form: {{p(ex=-1), p(ex=0), p(ex=1)}, 
{p(ey=-1), p(ey=0), p(ey=1)}, {p(hx=-1), p(hx=0), 
p(hx=1)}, {p(hy=-1), p(hy=0), p(hy=1)}}.  
2. If in one of the 12 probabilities of a frequent arc is 
greater than a threshold (0.5 in our simulations), it is 
considered as a codifiable arc, since the nodes joining 
the arc have more than a random link, as the movement 
could be codified for at least one actuator. 
If a codifiable arc has affective states as source and 
target nodes , it will be called a fact. This is considered 
the most refined state for the closure mechanism in the 
development of the arcs . This contrasts with the 
Drescher’s perspective, which considers reliability as 
the way to verify the arc’s functionality. 
Our method is imperfect in associating nodes in a 
strict causal way, but has the advantage it has no 
intention into reach specific nodes or to proof specific 
arcs, avoiding any “cognitive” consideration. The 
representation is developed only with the (imperfect) 
agent’s possibilities and not under our preconceived 
“true or false” considerations. This is because we are 
interested in the way the closure process occurs and not 
in its success as being “the best” fact constructor 
(Gershenson, 2004). Actually, further steps can be 
added to the closure mechanism defined here to refine 
the process. 
However, we stress that the important aspect is the 
network formed by facts, and that the closure 
mechanism does not stop when an arc has achieved the 
fact character, but continuously incorporates  new arcs 
and nodes  (which can become facts). 
                                                                 
2 If the values are too small, noise can be learned. If the values 
are too big, then it takes more time to learn. This also happens 
for other parameters of the model. 
4.1. Closure states 
To identify the agent’s closure state associated to 
every pair of consecutive sensing states, we use a set of 
three values (according to Table 1), one for the sensing 
in the time t-1, other for the sensing in the time t, and 
the third for the state of the link between them. 
Table 1. Codes of  closure states 
value node  arc 
0 not in representation not in representat ion 
1 potential affective state not frequent 
2 affective state frequent 
3 -  codifiable 
 
The closure state has 3x3x4 = 36 possibilities. For the 
specified closure mechanism, the state 223 has the 
highest “closure degree” and corresponds to a “closed” 
arc or fact. The particular closure’s state is a subjective 
appreciation for the agent, in the sense that it does not 
tell anything to an observer who does not have precise 
knowledge of the mechanism. 
Table 2 shows an example of a closure path towards 
forming a fact, following the states of nodes and arc 
000 ® 020 ®  121 ®  223. 
Table 2. Example of a closure path 
 
 
     
Closure 
State 
000 020 121 223 
Var.  
focus 
low low high high 
 
 
a) b) c) d) 
 
5. Behavior modulators 
As mentioned before, we are interested in evolving 
structured representations beyond the possibilities that 
historical embodiment can offer.  Following a bottom-up 
approach, we consider the importance of emotions 
(Minsky, 1980), being essential in the “independent 
dynamics” of representations. Still, we are interested in 
the emotional modulation of cognition (Dörner and 
Hille, 1995; Dolan, 2002; Dörner, 2003). In this sense, 
emotions are the observable result of a particular set of 
values for the behavior modulators. 
We will consider a humble approach to Dörner’s 
(2003) theory to test the idea that modifying the 
behavior according to the “closure state” (actual 
knowledge state) of an agent can help obtain more 
“knowledge”. We use a single behavior modulator 
which we call focus. This parameter, with values 
between 0 and 1, modulates the probability to revisit the 
previous sensing state, by undoing the last performed 
movements. It is called focus because it is a mechanism 
used to perceive again something by trying (with a 
probabilistic measure) to revisit a situation. 
A focus with value 0.0 means that the agent will 
always move in a random direction. A focus with value 
1.0 means that the agent will always undo the last 
movement. A focus value of 0.5 will make the agent to 
move with the same probability than to undo the last 
movement. Different focus values can be interpreted by 
an observer as different emotional states. For example a 
high focus value could be seen as “interest”. 
6. Experiments 
The experiments will be described from two 
perspectives, one internal  corresponding to the closure 
mechanism’s dynamics in incorporating signals and 
actuations, and other external corresponding to a 
network’s quantifiers as being macro variables. With 
this we attempt to address the constrained problem 
posed by Pattee (1995) of how matter and symbol are 
related. 
6.1. Internal Description 
6.1.1. Closure Dynamics: Constant Focus  
In a first set of experiments, we perform runs of the 
feed game during 15000 iterations, each one with 
different focus value: 0.0, 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. When 
focus has a value of 0.0, all the agent’s movements are 
random. On the others, all the movements are random 
but having a probability –equal to the focus value– to 
‘undo’ the last movement. 
We are interested in the way the focus affects the 
representation’s development given the system and the 
agent’s closure mechanism. Every time the system 
changes the closure’s state, either by incorporating a 
node, an arc, or changing their status in the 
representation, the agent has integrated more 
knowledge from the environment and its 
interrelationship, captured in the network.  
In order to follow the closure’s dynamics –
knowledge’s incorporation dynamics– a probabilistic 
network is built during the process considering the 
closure states as nodes and the possible changes 
between them as arcs, being weighted by the frequency 
of occurrence. 
We distinguish between two types of arc: loops and 
transitions. Those situations in which the agent remains 
in the same closure state for consecutive iterations –i.e. 
without knowledge incorporation– will be called loops 
and represent time without knowledge acquisition. 
Table 3 shows the loops’ relative frequencies for each 
focus (shown only =0.01 due to space restrictions). 
These represent the proportion of the global time the 
agent has experienced each type of loop. As the last row 
of the table shows, the agent is engaged in loops in 
more than the 85% of the total time. During loops, there 
is no distinguishable change in the closure mechanism, 
although there can be changes in the counters (e.g. it 
takes 8 occurrences to obtain a frequent arc). The 
number of loops changes according to the focus value; a 
lower loop frequency indicates less time without 
changes in the representation, learning faster. The focus 
plays a different role in learning depending on the 
specific loop. For example, in the loop 222-222 higher 
focus values are more convenient for the agent. On the 
other hand, low or no focus is convenient for the loop 
000-000. There is no “best” focus value, but the 
“optimal” value depends on the actual (internal) 
context. 
When the system experiences a change in the closure 
state, we can say that the system has incorporated 
structure in the representation. They will be called 
transitions. Table 4 shows the relative frequencies of 
transitions. The total time the agent develops its 
representation (transitions) is lower than the time 
devoted to loops. 
6.1.2. Taking Advantage of the Closure’s 
Dynamics: Variable Focus  
After analyzing the probabilistic networks 
corresponding to the closure structures obtained with 
each of the focus values , we chose for each closure 
state which focus value would be convenient to follow 
a path to the 223 state (facts) with less loops. 
Figure 3 shows in the probabilistic network of 
transitions how the focus values were selected. The 
thickness of arrows indicates the transition probability. 
Darker arrows mean that for a higher focus there is a 
higher probability for transitions, while lighter arrows 
indicate lower probabilities while there is a high focus. 
Dotted lines do not contribute to the development of 
facts, and their width does not represent their 
probability. 
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Figure 3. Probabilistic network of closure dynamics 
We repeated the feed game experiment but changing 
the focus value in function of the actual closure state 
according to the following simple rule: 
If {$closureState in [222 221 211 121 212 223 213]} 
{set focus 0.66} else {set focus 0.0} 
The system changes its focus value in a reactive way, 
depending only on the current closure state, not on the 
sensing states. 
The goal is not to find the “best” focus value for each 
closure state, but just to show that modifying the 
behavior modulator in terms of the closure state affects 
the acquired knowledge, obtaining a different structure 
of the global representation. 
The results are given in the lasts columns of Table 3 
and Table 4. We can see that the loops in which the 
agent spends more time decrease sensibly, and that the 
transition frequency rise or are maintained exc ept for 
the 110-111 case. A detailed analysis of the data shows 
that the paths to the state 223 ( facts) are favored. 
The Average Time per Transition (ATT) is the 
average number of iterations in which the agent 
experiences a change in the closure states. It reflects the 
required time to incorporate in the representation a new 
aspect obtained from the interaction with its 
environment. Lower value means faster ‘learning’. In 
Figure 4 we can see that a low focus enables the agent 
to learn faster than a high focus, but with a variable 
focus the agent learns even faster. 
Table 3. Relative frequencies of loops (=0.01) 
 Focus value 
loops 0 0.250 0.5 0.75 var 
222-222 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.17 
000-000 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.09 
223-223 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.19 
221-221 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.14 
121-121 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 
111-111 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 
211-211 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 
100-100 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 
010-010 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 
200-200 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
total 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.83 
Table 4. Relative frequencies of transitions (=0.01) 
 Focus value 
transitions  0 0.25 0.5 0.75 var 
110-111 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 
020-121 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 
210-211 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
120-121 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
221-223 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
220-221 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
121-223 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
total 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.17 
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Figure 4. Average Time per Transition 
6.2. External description: network 
properties 
Both loops and transitions as considered before are 
characteristic of the closure mechanism, reflecting the 
dynamics during the development of the network. Their 
analysis can be seen as made from an internal mode of 
description, because an observer would not have access 
to these processes in an animal (i.e. symbols). We now 
will make an analysis from an external mode of 
description, “dissecting” the structure of the agent. 
We can calculate the closure state distribution 
obtained from the resulting representation considering 
all the existing arcs and their associated nodes, as 
shown in Table 5. This distribution can be considered as 
an external observation, because it is a “picture” of the 
representation at a certain time, but does not give 
information on how the arcs have obtained their closure 
state. We can observe again that the focus affects the 
closure state of arcs in different ways. Although the 
“interesting” class of arcs is the 223, or facts, meaning 
the most elaborated kind of relation between signals and 
action. For facts, there is no significant variation with 
fixed focus values. But their frequency is increased in 
an important way (~50%) with variable focus. The trace 
on how facts are favored in this case can be followed in 
time in Figure 5. 
We used the Clustering Coefficient (Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998) of the representation network as a 
measure of global structure. In Figure 6 the Clustering 
Coefficient shows that the more efficient and more 
stable case is the one of variable focus. Both figures 
indicate that having a variable focus yields a high 
“volume” with “appropriate” density in the 
representation network. The variable behavior 
modulator actuates internally to produce improvements 
in the external  structure. In our model, the sensed turns 
into signal internally through the closure process, and 
the result can be measured externally in the structural 
properties of the representation network. 
Table 5. Closure state of arcs of final representation 
 Focus 
arcs  0 0.25 0.5 0.75 var 
121 586 539 503 243 586 
221 386 338 271 272 409 
211 264 341 364 191 447 
Facts: 223 213 188 204 211 307 
111 370 477 337 97 196 
222 59 59 43 43 94 
213 6 1 8 4 5 
212 1 1 2 0 0 
num.arcs 1885 1944 1732 1061 2044 
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Figure 5. Facts for Feed Game 
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Figure 6. Clustering coefficients for Feed Game 
We also analyzed the subnets related to each 
biological motivation (data not shown). Each subnet is 
similar to a scheme, more in the Piagetian sense than in 
the Drescher’s sense. This is because the subnet 
corresponds to structured knowledge with some 
biological meaning and not to concrete context -
actuation-result detection. The structural properties of 
subnets are better with a variable focus than with a fixed 
one. There are also more subnets with a variable focus, 
giving the possibility to develop more schemes. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this work, we isolated a representation’s evolving 
process, avoiding any use of “cognition” about the 
“state of the world”, to explore two aspects: a) the 
necessity of two modes of description in the Pattee’s 
sense, and more simply, a case study on  how the 
internal and external modes of description can be 
related, and b) how behavior modifiers based on 
internal considerations can affect the structural 
properties of the developed representation  
a) For the internal mode of description, we consider a 
built in mechanism called closure mechanism 
determining how and when to incorporate structurally 
related signals and actuations in a representation. The 
signals are assigned in terms of the sensing states but 
only when they are related directly or indirectly with a 
biological motivation. The actuations are incorporated 
in terms of actuator’s movements. The structural 
relationships are given in different stages, until possibly 
reaching the most elaborated state or fact: when a 
couple of adjacent affective states can be related more 
than in a random way. The closure mechanism has its 
own dynamics and can be observed as a probabilistic 
network which forms facts, being the internal mode of 
description. The external mode of description is given 
in terms of the properties of the network of facts.  
b) The closure mechanism is in itself a “knowledge 
acquisition mechanism” in the sense that it incorporates 
in the representation the structural relationships with the 
environment. Using a behavior modulator called focus, 
the representation and its structure can develop in 
different ways. A selective value (i.e. variable focus) 
for specific closure states improves the structural 
properties of the representation (external mode of 
description). 
Our model is not a behavior-based or knowledge-
based, but as simple as a reactive system. It is atypical 
for a “knowledge acquisition mechanism”, since the 
agent does not react to its world. However, the focus 
can modify the behavior patterns. The variable focus 
allows the agent to react to its knowledge state in order 
to incorporate faster the relationships with its 
environment. The obtained representation does not 
catch “structural” properties of the environment, but 
makes explicit the structural interactions between the 
agent and environment. We have avoided any use of the 
representation but these have a potentiality to be used. 
Only structural or historical embodiment is  not 
enough for obtaining autonomously rich 
representations. It seems the same as to think about only 
affordances. We need consider also an internal process 
“independent to the world’s dynamics” (Steels, 1995), 
in such a way that the representation becomes richer. 
Note that the mentioned dynamics is different from the 
related with the use of representations. In the agent’s 
life, both dynamics are crucial, and must be related, but 
at this moment we are concentrated in building 
representations. 
We conclude: 
a) Considering only dynamical aspects of the 
system-environment interaction can give us only 
historical embodiment. To obtain more structured 
representations we need to explore internal mechanisms 
to understand how structural properties can be 
bootstrapped. 
b) Structural properties in developing 
representations can be changed by using behavior 
modifiers, not considered as the nervous system in the 
epigenetic process but as the –less often considered but 
more basic– endocrine system which is related to 
emotions. 
c) A selective use of this parameter depending on 
the closure state, (“knowledge state”), improves the 
bootstrapping of structure. We consider this as a 
fundamental step in understanding how the use of 
representations can rise to manage “knowledge” starting 
from reactive systems. 
d) The resulting system with a simple “internal 
dynamics” is a knowledge acquisition mechanism 
allowing more structure in the resulting representation 
that the solely historical or structural embodiment can 
provide but without any cognitive, purposeful or 
intentional consideration. 
e) For studying representations, both a structural 
and a dynamical description are necessary. This helps in 
elucidating the problem of how symbols are related to 
matter (Pattee, 1995). 
As a future work, we can see several directions which 
could be followed. Intersubjective representations could 
be obtained by pragmatic games in which two or more 
agents interact with an environment. This topic is 
interesting for studies in the evolution of 
communication. Another direction would be to study 
the effect of different behavior modifiers in the 
development of the representation. 
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